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PRIVATE ACTORS, PUBLIC RECORDS, AND NEW
MEXICO’S INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT
By: John Kreienkamp*

INTRODUCTION
The term “public records” is understood by the public to mean records of
governmental institutions. This is straightforward enough: those records held by
government entities and related to their work are public records and, in New Mexico,
all individuals, companies, and entities are guaranteed access to them through the
Inspection of Public Records Act (“IPRA”).1 But the relative simplicity of this
proposition is belied slightly by the fact that government entities have employees
and private contractors who sometimes possess records related to public business in
their own private e-mails, cell phones, or offices. In those cases, where records are
held by a private individual or corporation but effectively on behalf of a government
entity, this leads to real questions as to the application of IPRA and open government
principles more generally.
In a series of three recent court decisions, New Mexico’s appellate courts
have grappled with IPRA’s implications for private entities. In State ex rel. Toomey
v. City of Truth or Consequences2 and New Mexico Foundation for Open
Government v. Corizon Health,3 the Court of Appeals held that the records of a
private contractor performing services on behalf of a public body were subject to
inspection under IPRA to the extent they related to government business. In both of
these cases, the private contractor was one of the defendants in the lawsuit. By
contrast, in Pacheco v. Hudson,4 the Supreme Court determined that records
associated with a social media page operated by the reelection campaign of a sitting
District Court judge were not public records because they were not effectively held
on behalf of a public body. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that the sitting
District Court judge was not a proper defendant in the lawsuit.5 However, these three
cases sent mixed signals as to the finer point of whether IPRA applied to private
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J.D. (2015), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; M.Sc. in International Politics (2011),
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1. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-1 to -12 (2019).
2. 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 25, 287 P.3d 364, 371.
3. 2019-NMCA-014, ¶ 21, 460 P.3d 43, 51.
4. 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 36, 415 P.3d 505, 512–13.
5. See Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 57, 415 P.3d at 516 (holding that the public body’s designated
records custodian “is the only official who statutorily ‘is subject to an action to enforce’ IPRA”) (citing
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-11(C)).
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entities themselves or merely their records. In other words, to whom should an IPRA
request be directed: the public body or the private entity? And who is the proper
defendant in an action to enforce IPRA: the public body or the private entity?
This article maintains that IPRA requests must be directed to the public
body, not a private contractor, and that a private entity is not a proper defendant in
an action to enforce IPRA. Based on IPRA’s plain language and overall statutory
purpose, the decisions in Toomey, Pacheco, and Corizon should be read narrowly as
holding only that the records of a private entity are public records when held on
behalf of a public body. The nine-factor test from Toomey,6 weighing the
circumstances to determine whether records are effectively held on behalf of a public
body, should not be misconstrued to subject a private entity itself to IPRA. Instead,
only a private entity’s records may be subject to IPRA through the public body on
whose behalf the private entity is operating. An IPRA request should be directed to
the public body, not the private contractor or employee. And, in the event of alleged
noncompliance with IPRA, the public body is the proper defendant, not its private
contractor.
The first section of this article describes the history of IPRA, particularly as
it relates to private entities. First, it traces the evolution of IPRA over time, with an
emphasis on its shifting scope and provisions, until the statute reached approximately
its current form roughly thirty years ago. The article then discusses Toomey,
Pacheco, and Corizon in detail, explaining each case’s procedural history and the
respective court’s decision. The second section analyzes the holdings in all three
cases and outlines various possible interpretations. Finally, this article argues that
these three cases cannot, consistent with IPRA, be interpreted as holding that private
entities may constitute public bodies for the purposes of specific public records
requests.
I.
A.

IPRA AND ITS RELATION TO PRIVATE ACTORS

The Inspection of Public Records Act

The Inspection of Public Records Act was signed into law in 1947.7
Originally referred to inconsistently as either “New Mexico’s ‘right to know’ act”8
or the “Inspection of Public Records Act,”9 the statute in its first form was relatively
simple and undeveloped in comparison to today’s much more detailed statute.10 For
example, IPRA at first contained no stated civil remedies of any kind for

6. See Toomey, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 13, 287 P.3d at 368.
7. See 1947 N.M. Laws, ch. 130, § 1.
8. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, ¶ 30, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (referring to “New
Mexico’s ‘right to know’ act, § 71-5-1, et seq.”), superseded by statute as stated in Republican Party of
N.M. v. N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, 283 P.3d 853.
9. See N.M. Atty. Gen. Op. 63-55 (1963) (referring to “the Inspection of Public Records Act”).
10. In its modern form, IPRA consists of eleven separate sections that, cumulatively speaking, set
forth a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the public’s right to inspect public records, the
procedures for both requesting and providing public records, and the civil penalties for noncompliance by
public bodies. At the time of its initial enactment, however, IPRA consisted of only three short sections
that were far less comprehensive. See 1947 N.M. Laws, ch. 130, § 1.
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noncompliance by public bodies,11 no provisions requiring public bodies to provide
copies of public records by way of postal mail, and not even a single definition of
any term. However, while the statute was at that time undeniably less expansive than
it is today, it did stand for an important public policy: that “[e]very citizen of this
State has a right to inspect any public records of this State” except as otherwise
provided by law.12
As first enacted, IPRA provided the public with the right to inspect “any
state, county, school, city or town records in this state.”13 Notably, this earlier version
of the statute did not contain the phrase “public body,” whether to describe its scope
or otherwise. Instead, the statute provided that it applied to any “state, county, school,
city or town.”14 By contrast, IPRA in its first form did use the term “public records”
in several of its provisions.15 However, as the New Mexico Supreme Court noted in
at least one opinion, IPRA did not define the term and this led to some ambiguity as
to which particular records fell within the ambit of the statute.16
Although several smaller-scale amendments were made to IPRA between
1973 and 1983,17 the statute was overhauled and modernized into approximately its
current form in 1993.18 The 1993 amendment added an array of provisions to the
statute, including those that set forth specific deadlines,19 required each public body
to designate its own “records custodian” who would be responsible for public records
11. One of the most notable differences between IPRA as it exists today and its initial 1947 version
is that the latter contained only a criminal penalty for noncompliance by “any officer having the custody
of any state, county, school, city or town records in this state.” 1947 N.M. Laws, ch. 130, § 2. By contrast,
today IPRA does not include any criminal penalties for noncompliance and instead only provides for civil
enforcement by the District Courts. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-12(B) (1993) (“A district court may
issue a writ of mandamus or order an injunction or other appropriate remedy to enforce the provisions of
the Inspection of Public Records Act.”).
12. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-501 (1947) (emphasis added). Following the 1953 recompilation of the
New Mexico Statutory Code, this statute became Section 71-5-1.
13. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (1947) (“All officers having the custody of any state, county,
school, city or town records in this state shall furnish proper and reasonable opportunities for the
inspection and examination of all the records requested of their respective offices.”); see also N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-503 (1947) (providing a criminal penalty for a violation of the statute by “any officer having
the custody of any state, county, school, city or town records in this state”).
14. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-502 to -503 (1947).
15. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-501 to -503 (1947).
16. See State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, ¶ 30, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (“New
Mexico’s ‘right to know’ act, § 71-5-1, et seq. does not define ‘public record.’”). See also N.M. Att’y
Gen. Op. 51-5342 (1951) (opining that many of the records created and held by the New Mexico State
Penitentiary and the Prison Board were public records for the purposes of IPRA); N.M. Att’y Gen. Op.
47-5074 (1947) (concluding that criminal complaints filed with justices of the peace by law enforcement
agencies “before the accused has been arrested” were not public records).
17. See 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 271, § 1 (adding exceptions to disclosure for letters of reference and
matters of opinion in personnel files and students cumulative files); 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 47, § 3
(amending the statute to incorporate exceptions to disclosure contained in the Confidential Materials Act);
1983 N.M. Laws, ch. 141, § 1 (amending IPRA’s enforcement mechanism to permit an “aggrieved
citizen” to file a petition for a writ of mandamus in District Court to compel the production of records).
18. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 258, §§ 1–10.
19. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 258, § 5 (requiring public bodies to allow the requestor to inspect the
requested records “immediately or as soon as is practicable under the circumstances, but not later than
fifteen days after receiving a written request” and additionally requiring public bodies to send a written
communication to the requestor within three business days).
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requests,20 and bestowed on the statute the formal title of the “Inspection of Public
Records Act.”21 Although the Legislature has continually updated and amended
IPRA in the past twenty years,22 the 1993 amendment effectively transformed the
statute into the version in place today.
Today, IPRA sets forth a comprehensive statutory scheme governing public
records requests in New Mexico. Individuals are guaranteed the right to both
inspect23 and obtain copies24 of public records held by or on behalf of any “public
body.”25 A public body in receipt of an IPRA request must respond to all written
requests within three business days26 and provide all requested records within fifteen
calendar days,27 unless the public body designates the request to be excessively
burdensome or broad, in which case an additional “reasonable” amount of time to
respond is permitted.28 Public bodies may charge fees only for copies of records and
must otherwise allow inspection free of charge.29
IPRA effectively operates through a singular point of contact and reference
within each public body: the records custodian. All public bodies are affirmatively
required by IPRA to designate at least one individual within their agency to be the
records custodian,30 who is responsible for carrying out virtually all of the public
body’s IPRA requirements. Most importantly, the records custodian is the individual

20. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 258, § 4 (requiring each public body designate a records custodian who
would be required to “receive and respond to requests to inspect public records,” among other duties).
21. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 258, § 1.
22. See, e.g., 1998 N.M. Laws (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1; 2011 N.M. Laws, ch. 134, §§ 2–6; 2019 N.M.
Laws, ch. 27, § 1.
23. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-7(C) (2011) (requiring records custodians to provide “proper and
reasonable opportunities to inspect public records”).
24. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-7(D) (2011) (requiring records custodians to “provide reasonable
facilities to make or furnish copies of the public records”). A public body cannot charge the requestor for
their inspection of the public records, but the public body may charge “reasonable” copying fees. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. 14-2-9(C) (2013). See also NEW MEXICO ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INSPECTION OF
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDE 37 (8th ed. 2015) (explaining that IPRA “does not permit the
custodian to require payment in advance of allowing inspection”) (emphasis added).
25. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (2019) (“Every person” the right to “inspect public records of this
state.”). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-6(G) (2018) (defining “public record” as a record held by or
on behalf of a “public body”).
26. IPRA provides that a public records custodian must issue a written communication to the
requestor within three business days if the requested records are not immediately available. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-8(D) (2009) (“If the inspection is not permitted within three business days, the
custodian shall explain in writing when the records will be available for inspection or when the public
body will respond to the request.”).
27. With the exception of excessively broad and burdensome requests, see infra note 29, IPRA
requires a records custodian in receipt of a public records request to “permit the inspection immediately
or as soon as is practicable under the circumstances, but not later than fifteen days after receiving a written
request.” § 14-2-8(D).
28. The exception to IPRA’s general fifteen-day rule is for requests designated in writing by the
public body to be “excessively burdensome or broad,” for which “an additional reasonable period of time
shall be allowed to comply with the request.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-10 (2018).
29. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-9(C)(1) (2019) (providing that a records custodian “may charge
reasonable fees for copying the public records”) (emphasis added).
30. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-7 (2011) (“Each public body shall designate at least one custodian
of public records . . . .”).
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who must receive and respond to IPRA requests.31 The deadlines for IPRA—for
example, providing records within fifteen calendar days and acknowledging a
request within three business days—are all calculated from the date on which the
public body’s records custodian receives the request.32 The records custodian
shoulders the burden of providing requestors both “proper and reasonable
opportunities to inspect public records” and “reasonable facilities to make or furnish
copies of the public records during usual business hours.”33 Whenever a public body
denies a records request, the records custodian must provide the requestor “a written
explanation of denial.”34 The records custodian must also post a notice “in a
conspicuous location” at the public body’s administrative office and on its website
describing the public’s right to inspect public records and the procedures through
which a request may be made.35 Finally, IPRA itself specifies that a public body’s
records custodian “is subject to an action to enforce the provisions of the Inspection
of Public Records Act” in District Court.36 As a whole, virtually all of IPRA’s
statutory apparatus depends on the designated records custodian.
IPRA now also contains definitions that both clarify its scope and shed light
on its potential applicability to private entities. In particular, IPRA now defines both
of the terms “public body” and “public record.” Section 14-2-6(F) defines the term
“public body”37 as limited only to branches of government, including:
[T]he executive, legislative and judicial branches of state and local
governments and all advisory boards, commissions, committees,

31. See § 14-2-7 (providing that the records custodian is responsible for both receiving and
responding to IPRA requests).
32. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-8(D) (2009) (providing that the three-day time frame for the public
body’s acknowledgement of a request “shall not begin until the written request is delivered to the office
of the custodian”). However, in the event that a request is sent to the wrong records custodian, or an
employee at a public body who is not the records custodian, the request must be forwarded to the correct
custodian “promptly.” § 14-2-8(E).
33. § 14-2-7.
34. IPRA specifically requires that “the custodian” provide the requestor a “written explanation of
denial” whenever the public body denies the request either in whole or in part. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-211(B) (1993). This written explanation must include a description of the records sought, “the names and
titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial,” and the legal exception to disclosure
authorizing the public body to deny the request. § 14-2-11(B)(2); see also NEW MEXICO ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDE 41 (8th ed. 2015) (explaining that
“[t]he denial notice must . . . explain the reason for the denial” and that “[t]he reason provided in the denial
notice must be authorized by the Act, another law, court rule, or the U.S. or state constitution”). See also
infra note 42.
35. § 14-2-7(E). Specifically, a public body’s inspection notice must include a description of “the
right of a person to inspect a public body’s records,” the contact information for the records custodian and
a more general description of how a requestor might go about submitting a records request to the public
body, and “the responsibility of a public body to make available public records for inspection.” Id.
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-12(C) (1993). As the New Mexico Supreme Court held in Pacheco,
“The designated records custodian is the only official who is assigned IPRA compliance duties, see § 142-7, and is the only official who statutorily ‘is subject to an action to enforce’ IPRA, see § 14-2-11(C).”
2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 57, 415 P.3d 505, 516.
37. See § 14-2-7 (requiring all public bodies to designate a records custodian to receive and respond
to requests for public records); § 14-2-12(C) (providing for damages “payable from the funds of the public
body” found to be in noncompliance with IPRA).
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agencies or entities created by the constitution or any branch of
government that receives any public funding, including political
subdivisions, special taxing districts, school districts and
institutions of higher education.38
Further clarifying its scope, IPRA’s Section 14-2-6(G) defines “public
records” as:
[A]ll documents, papers, letters, books, maps, tapes, photographs,
recordings and other materials, regardless of physical form or
characteristics, that are used, created, received, maintained or held
by or on behalf of any public body and relate to public business,
whether or not the records are required by law to be created or
maintained.39
In the context of private entities, this definition is striking because it uses
the phrase “on behalf of any public body,” which is not itself defined in the statute.40
The clear import of this definition is that IPRA, by its plain language, extends to at
least some records held by private entities: those that are held “on behalf of” a public
body. In any case, through these two definitions of “public body” and “public
record,” IPRA essentially provides individuals with the right to inspect any public
record held by or on behalf of any public body in New Mexico, except as otherwise
provided in the statute itself.41
Although IPRA’s plain language is of enormous consequence when
interpreting the statute’s various provisions,42 the legislative intent behind the statute
is also of paramount importance. IPRA’s expressed purpose is to provide the public
with access to “the greatest possible information” regarding governmental affairs.43
The statute leaves no ambiguity as to that purpose, stating in Section 14-2-5 that it
represents “the public policy of this state” and also adding that providing the public
with information and records “is an essential function of a representative government
and an integral part of the routine duties of public officers and employees.”44 In light
of the oft-stated canon of statutory interpretation that requires courts to effectuate the

38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-6(F) (2018).
39. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-6(G) (2018).
40. See Toomey v. Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 10, 287 P.3d 364, 367 (“The ‘on
behalf of’ language . . . is not defined”).
41. IPRA contains eight exceptions to disclosure, the last of which operates as a catch-all to
incorporate other provisions in law. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1(H). In analyzing the “as otherwise
provided by law” exception, the New Mexico Supreme Court has noted that the exception extends to
“statutory or regulatory exceptions, or privileges adopted by this Court or grounded in the constitution.”
Republican Party N.M. v. N.M. Tax. Rev. Dept., 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 853, 860.
42. It is well-established that “where the meaning of statutory language is plain, and words used by
the legislature are free of ambiguity, there is no basis for interpreting the statute.” Johnson v. Francke,
1987-NMCA-029, ¶ 11, 734 P.2d 804, 806. See also State v. Ogden, 1994-NMSC-029, ¶ 24, 880 P.2d
845, 853 (noting that the goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature
“using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent).
43. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-5 (1993).
44. Id.
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intent of the legislature,45 this public purpose has repeatedly been emphasized by
courts construing IPRA’s various provisions.46
B.

Private Entities and IPRA

Although IPRA’s modern applicability to state and local governmental
agencies is clear and relatively unambiguous as a legal matter, the statute contains
only an implied reference to records held by private actors. Specifically, the
definition of a public record includes those records that are held “on behalf of” public
bodies.47 This has proven to create no small amount of uncertainty with respect to
records held by private actors in an era in which government agencies are
increasingly contracting with private companies to provide governmental services.48
The first appellate case in New Mexico to discuss in detail the issue of
IPRA’s applicability to private entities and records held by private entities was State
ex rel. Toomey v. City of Truth or Consequences.49 In that case, the Court of Appeals
held that a series of video recordings possessed by a private company operating
pursuant to a contract with a municipality were public records for the purposes of
IPRA.50 The decision, along with its reasoning and analysis, has proven to be
particularly consequential, having been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases
addressing similar issues.
Toomey involved records held by a private contractor, the Sierra
Community Council, Inc. (“SCC”), who was operating on behalf of the City of Truth
or Consequences (the “City”).51 The City had entered into a contract with SCC to
operate a public access cable channel (that was itself authorized by a City
ordinance).52 Although the City provided the funding necessary for SCC to run the
cable channel and required an annual accounting from SCC as to how that funding
was spent,53 the Court of Appeals noted in its decision that the contract between the
45. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 2006-NMCA-106, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 1284, 1286 (observing that when
interpreting a statute the “primary goal” of appellate courts is to “give effect to the intent of the
legislature”); State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 23, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (observing
that “it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent”).
46. See, e.g., San Juan Agr. Water Users Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 2011-NMSC-011, ¶ 14, 257 P.3d 884,
888 (noting that courts “construe IPRA in light of its purpose”); Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010NMCA-096, ¶ 16, 242 P.3d 501, 506 (explaining that, in interpreting IPRA and its exceptions, courts must
“begin . . . with the strong presumption that the public has a right to inspect”).
47. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
48. See Anna Ya Ni & Stuart Bretschneider, The Decision to Contract Out: A Study of Contracting
for E-Government Services in State Governments, 67 PUBLIC ADM. REV. 3, 532 (2007) (noting that
“government contracts with the private and nonprofit sectors have rapidly increased in volume and
extended to various service areas” and that surveys have shown “a significant movement toward
privatization, particularly [in] contracting”).
49. 2012-NMCA-104, 287 P.3d 364.
50. See Toomey v. Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 25, 287 P.3d 364, 371 (holding that
“the DVD recordings were public records subject to inspection”).
51. Id. ¶ 5, 287 P.3d at 366.
52. Id. ¶ 4, 287 P.3d at 366.
53. See id. ¶ 24, 287 P.3d at 370 (noting that the City “funded SCC with an annual grant of $3 per
subscriber from the cable company as well as with ninety percent of the franchise fees paid to the City by
[the cable company]” and that “SCC was required to provide an accounting of how the City’s funds were
spent”).
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parties specifically “identified SCC as an independent contractor and stated that no
principal/agent or employer/employee relationship existed between SCC and the
City.”54 As part of its operation of the cable channel, SCC staff recorded various City
Commission meetings for replay on television.55
The dispute in Toomey arose out of a public records request that the plaintiff
submitted to the City.56 That request specifically sought “recordings of three City
Commission meetings and one city workshop on truck traffic that had been played
on the [cable] channel.”57 Upon receipt of the request, the City Clerk forwarded it to
SCC, who refused to fulfill the request, and then informed the plaintiff that SCC was
not required to maintain such records pursuant to the contract with the City.58
Although one of the requested records did exist at that time and was being held by
SCC,59 the City nevertheless denied the request.60 The plaintiff promptly filed suit
against the City and the City Clerk, seeking injunctive relief and access to the
requested records. However, the plaintiff also included as defendants both the SCC
and the SCC employee who had refused to fulfill the request.61 After the District
Court ruled in favor of the defendants,62 the plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The central issue posed to the Court of Appeals in Toomey, as posed by the
parties to the case,63 was whether the SCC recordings constituted public records.64
The Court phrased this issue variously, first as whether the relevant records “were
made on behalf of the City so as to constitute public records within the meaning of
IPRA,”65 and later as “whether a private actor that contracts with a governmental

54. Id. ¶ 3, 287 P.3d at 366.
55. Id. ¶ 4, 287 P.3d at 366.
56. Id.
57. Id. ¶ 5, 287 P.3d at 366.
58. Id.
59. See id. ¶ 6, 287 P.3d at 366 (noting the District Court’s finding that “at the time of the request,
one meeting was still on SCC’s computer”).
60. Id. ¶ 5, 287 P.3d at 366.
61. Id. ¶ 6, 287 P.3d at 366.
62. After holding a bench trial, the District Court ruled in favor of the defendants. Id. Although the
District Court’s ruling was not addressed at great length by the Court of Appeals, the latter did note that
the District Court ultimately concluded that the recording held by SCC was not a public record. Id. As
explained by the Court of Appeals, the District Court had emphasized that “SCC was an independent
contractor, not an agent of the City,” and that “nothing in the operating agreement required SCC to create,
maintain, or hold recordings of City meetings on behalf of the City.” Id.
63. Some of the ambiguity left in the wake of Toomey may stem from the fact that the parties to the
case, according to the decision itself, failed to provide the Court much in the way of coherent briefing.
The decision was less than complementary in its description of the briefing it received by the parties,
noting at one point that “the parties’ arguments are not helpful.” Id. ¶ 11, 287 P.3d at 367. In particular,
the Court noted that the City’s brief was “bereft of any argument on the relevant issues, leaving us without
a coherent understanding of its position on appeal,” that it failed contain either legal analysis or supporting
authority, and (perhaps most glaringly) that the City’s brief had neglected “to discuss IPRA.” Id. ¶ 7, 287
P.3d at 366.
64. As the Court of Appeals phrased it, “the dispositive question is whether SCC’s recordings of the
City’s meetings were made on behalf of the City so as to constitute public records within the meaning of
IPRA.” Id. ¶ 8, 287 P.3d at 366.
65. See id.
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entity to perform a public function is subject to the provisions of IPRA.”66
Regardless, the opinion began by focusing heavily on IPRA’s definition of a public
record and in particular the definition’s inclusion of records that are held “on behalf
of” the public body.67 The Court of Appeals noted that, “[t]he ‘on behalf of’
language . . . is not defined, and the statute does not indicate whether every
purportedly public document created or held by a private entity comes within the
ambit of IPRA or whether there are any limitations to production of requested
records.”68
Observing that the issue was a matter of first impression, the Court of
Appeals looked to case law from other states for guidance.69 Many of these cases
involved the issue of whether a private entity could become the functional equivalent
of a public body for the purposes of that state’s public records law.70 In particular,
the Court of Appeals looked to a number of decisions from Florida, where courts
generally utilized a “totality of factors test” to apply that State’s public records law
to private entities acting on behalf of public agencies.71 In News & Sun-Sentinel Co.
v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Gr., Inc., the Florida Supreme Court
outlined nine non-exhaustive factors to consider in such cases:
(1) The level of public funding; (2) commingling of funds; (3)
whether the activity was conducted on publicly owned property;
(4) whether services contracted for are an integral part of the public
agency’s chosen decision-making process; (5) whether the private
66. Id. ¶ 10, 287 P.3d at 367.
67. See id. The Toomey opinion did not discuss or cite IPRA’s definition of a public body. See infra
note 160 for a discussion of the codification of IPRA’s definition of public body and public record.
68. Toomey, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 10, 287 P.3d at 367
69. See id. ¶ 11, 287 P.3d at 367 (“Because the parties’ arguments are not helpful and because this is
a matter of first impression, we look to other jurisdictions that have squarely faced this issue for
guidance.”).
70. See id. ¶ 15–19, 287 P.3d at 368–69. See also Mem’l Hosp.-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal
Corp., 729 So.2d 373, 379–82 (Fla. 1999) (holding that a private nonprofit corporation operating a hospital
pursuant to a lease with a public agency was acting on behalf of a public agency and therefore constituted
an agency for the purposes of public records); Connecticut Humane Soc’y v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n,
591 A.2d 395, 396–97 (Conn. 1991) (holding that a humane society was not a public agency for the
purposes of public records and concluding that “the determination of whether a hybrid public/private
entity is a public agency subject to the FOIA requires a balance case-by-case consideration of various
factors”); A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 464 A.2d 1068, 1074 (Md. 1983) (holding that an
insurance guaranty association was “an agency or instrumentality of the State within the scope of the
Public Information Act”); News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Wake Cnty. Hosp. Sys., 284 S.E.2d 542, 548–
49 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a nonprofit corporation was an “agency” of North Carolina
government for the purposes of public records).
71. Toomey, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 14, 287 P.3d at 368. See also B & S Utilities, Inc. v. BaskervilleDonovan, Inc., 988 So. 2d 17, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a private company’s records
“generated in performing engineering services for the City over the more than fifteen years it has served
as the de facto city engineer are public records”) (emphasis in original); Dade Aviation Consultants v.
Knight Ridder, Inc., 800 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a private company’s
records were subject to disclosure); Volusia, 729 So. 2d at 380 (Fla. 1999) (holding that a nonprofit
hospital corporation was subject to Florida’s public records laws because it was operating on behalf of the
local hospital taxing authority); News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Grp.,
Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1033 (Fla. 1992) (holding that “an architectural firm . . . that contracts to provide
professional services for the construction of a school is not acting on behalf of a public agency”).
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entity is performing a governmental function or a function which
the public agency otherwise would perform; (6) the extent of the
public agency’s involvement with, regulation of, or control over
the private entity; (7) whether the private entity was created by the
public agency; (8) whether the public agency has a substantial
financial interest in the private entity; and (9) for who’s benefit the
private entity is functioning.72
Concluding that other states “have adopted approaches analogous to the
totality of factors approach of Florida,”73 the Court of Appeals held that New Mexico
too would use the nine-factor test from Schwab to gauge the totality of the
circumstances and determine whether a private entity was acting “on behalf of” a
public body.74
In reaching its conclusion that the nine-factor test from Schwab was
consistent with IPRA and New Mexico case law, the Court of Appeals also cited to
two New Mexico Supreme Court cases addressing related issues.75 The first of these
was Raton Public Service Company v. Hobbes,76 which involved an earlier version
of the Open Meetings Act.77 In that case, the Supreme Court determined that the
board of directors of a private company was effectively “a governing body of a
municipality, or a governmental board or commission of a subdivision of the state,
supported by public funds” so as to be subject to New Mexico’s laws governing open
meetings.78 In making this determination, the Supreme Court noted that the private
company received significant government funding and operated exclusively for the
benefit of a municipality. The Court of Appeals also cited to Memorial Medical
Center, Inc. v. Tatsch Construction, Inc.,79 a case in which the Supreme Court had
held that the proper standard to determine whether a private hospital corporation was
subject to the provisions of both New Mexico’s Public Works Minimum Wage Act
and the Procurement Code was “whether under the totality of the circumstances, the
private entity is so intertwined with a public entity that the private entity becomes an
alter ego of the public entity.”80
The Court of Appeals concluded its decision in Toomey by applying the
nine factors from Schwab and analyzing the totality of the circumstances. It
emphasized that SCC had contracted with the City to operate the cable channel for
public access; that the City had provided the necessary funding for SCC to operate
the cable channel; and that the City required an annual accounting from SCC as to
how this funding was spent.81 In addition, the record contained additional evidence
72. Schwab, 596 So. 2d at 1031 (Fla. 1992).
73. Toomey, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 16, 287 P.3d at 368. The Court of Appeals cited to cases from
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and Oregon as support for this conclusion. Id. ¶¶ 16–19, 287 P.3d
at 368–69.
74. Id. ¶ 22, 287 P.3d at 370.
75. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 287 P.3d at 369–370.
76. 1966-NMSC-150, 417 P.2d 32.
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-15-1 to -4 (2013).
78. Raton, 1966-NMSC-150, ¶¶ 4, 13, 417 P.2d at 33, 35.
79. 2000-NMSC-030, 12 P.3d 431.
80. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 2000-NMSC-030, ¶ 1, 12 P.3d at 434.
81. Toomey v. Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 24, 287 P.3d 364, 370.
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of the City’s oversight of SCC’s activities: the agreement specifically provided that
“the City would only release these funds to SCC after SCC provided it with an annual
activity plan and budget and that SCC could only spend the funds for the scope of
services listed in that plan” and that SCC would make all of its records related to the
cable channel available to the City upon request.82 Based on these facts, the Court of
Appeals concluded that “SCC was acting ‘on behalf of’ the City” and that the records
in question “were public records subject to inspection.”83 In describing its own
conclusion, the Court also stated that it had determined “that under the totality of the
circumstances, the SCC was the functional equivalent of a public agency in this
case.”84
Six years after the Toomey decision was issued, the New Mexico Supreme
Court had occasion to address the issue of private entities and IPRA in Pacheco v.
Hudson.85 Although that case primarily addressed other issues, in particular whether
New Mexico would recognize a constitutional judicial deliberations privilege as an
exception to disclosure under IPRA86 and which District Court could enforce IPRA,87
it also addressed Toomey in some detail. In doing so, the Supreme Court effectively
confirmed that the nine-factor test from Schwab and Toomey was the proper standard
to determine whether the records of a private entity constituted public records for the
purposes of IPRA.88
The IPRA lawsuit in Pacheco itself arose from another (non-IPRA) civil
lawsuit in New Mexico’s First Judicial District Court.89 One of the attorneys in the
first lawsuit submitted two IPRA requests, one directed to the First Judicial District
Court90 and another to District Court Judge Wilson, who presided over the civil
lawsuit.91 The request to the First Judicial District Court sought a variety of
communications involving Judge Wilson,92 including email communications
between him and his wife, who was employed at that time as a Supreme Court law
librarian.93 These same records were also sought in the IPRA request directed to
Judge Wilson, but this latter request also specifically asked for records associated
with his “personal election campaign Facebook page” including private messages, a

82. Id.
83. Id. ¶ 25, 287 P.3d at 370.
84. Id. ¶ 23, 287 P.3d at 370.
85. 2018-NMSC-022, 415 P.3d 505.
86. See id. ¶ 54, 415 P.3d at 515 (holding that certain communications were shielded from disclosure
under IPRA pursuant to the judicial deliberations privilege).
87. See id. ¶ 66, 415 P.3d at 517 (holding that “the Fifth Judicial District Court had no constitutional
jurisdiction to litigate any aspect of an IPRA enforcement action against the First Judicial District Court”).
88. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
89. See Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 4, 415 P.3d at 507 (explaining that “the controversy arose from
a civil case in the First Judicial District Court, State ex rel. King v. Valley Meat Co., LLC”) (italics in
original).
90. Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 5, 415 P.3d at 507–08.
91. Id. ¶ 6, 415 P.3d at 508.
92. Id. ¶ 5, 415 P.3d at 507-08.
93. See id. ¶ 14, 415 P.3d at 509 (noting that the District Court judge’s wife “was an employee of the
Supreme Court Law Library”).
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list of Facebook members who had “liked” the page, and copies of posts on the page
itself.94
The designated records custodian for the First Judicial District Court
responded to both of the IPRA requests at issue in Pacheco,95 despite the fact that
one of the requests had been submitted not to the Court itself but instead to Judge
Wilson. In relevant part, the records custodian responded to the requests by providing
some records but withholding others as subject to legal privileges. As to the request
for records associated with Judge Wilson’s social media page, the records custodian
explained to the requestor that “the court was not in a position to produce items
related to Judge Wilson’s personal election campaign Facebook page, none of which
were ‘used, created, received, maintained, or held by or on behalf of the First Judicial
District Court.’”96 The requestor in Pacheco then filed an IPRA enforcement action
in New Mexico’s Fifth Judicial District Court,97 which concluded that “Judge Wilson
had not been acting in any official judicial capacity in establishing or maintaining
his election campaign Facebook page,”98 but granted partial summary judgment in
the requestor’s favor as to other records.99
Pacheco went directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court after the First
Judicial District Court, one of the defendants, filed a petition for a writ of
superintending control.100 After initially remanding the case back to the Fifth Judicial
District Court so that the lower court could “complete the adjudication of all issues
outstanding in the case,”101 the Supreme Court issued the writ of superintending
control requested by the First Judicial District Court and ruled in favor of the
defendants on all issues involved.102 Importantly, this included the issue of Judge
Wilson’s social media page.

94. Id. ¶ 6, 415 P.3d at 508. The request directed to the District Court judge sought an extensive array
of records “relating to the ‘Keep Judge Matthew Wilson Facebook page’ on an Internet social media
website maintained by Judge Wilson’s personal election campaign.” Id. This included “copies of all
private Facebook message to or from Judge Wilson” as well as “copies of the ‘permissions settings’ for
the Facebook page.” Id.
95. The Court of Appeals decision noted that the records custodian for the First Judicial District Court
“responded to both IPRA requests, advising [the requestor] that as an executive officer of the First Judicial
District Court he, and not Judge Wilson, was the district court’s custodian of records designated to receive
and respond to IPRA requests.” Id. ¶ 7, 415 P.3d at 508.
96. Id. ¶ 8, 415 P.3d at 508.
97. Id. ¶ 9, 415 P.3d at 508. The Supreme Court decision specifically noted that the plaintiffs in the
IPRA enforcement lawsuit had named Judge Wilson and the First Judicial District Court as defendants
but not the records custodian for the First Judicial District Court. Id.
98. Id. ¶ 15, 415 P.3d at 509.
99. Id. ¶ 17, 415 P.3d at 509 (noting that the District Court judge had “granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the judicial defendants on all issues except the undisclosed e-mail exchange between
Judge Wilson and Supreme Court Law Librarian Stephanie Wilson regarding the request to proofread a
preliminary draft of an order in the underlying lawsuit and the thirteen pages of e-mails disclosed after
commencement of the IPRA enforcement action”).
100. Id. ¶ 18, 415 P.3d at 509.
101. Id. ¶ 19, 415 P.3d at 509.
102. The writ directed the Fifth Judicial District Court to vacate its the grant of partial summary
judgment and to dismiss the entire IPRA enforcement action due to a lack of jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 70,
415 P.3d at 518.
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The Supreme Court decisively held in Pacheco that “the contents of Judge
Wilson’s personal election campaign Facebook page were not public records of a
public body subject to IPRA disclosure requirements.”103 In reviewing this issue, the
Court began by quoting IPRA’s definitions of both a public body104 and a public
record,105 as well as emphasizing the purpose behind the statute.106 Stating, “We
recognize that it is possible for a public body to involve a private entity in conducting
governmental business and subject the otherwise private entity’s records relating to
that governmental activity to IPRA requirements,”107 the Supreme Court cited to
Toomey and affirmed that the Court of Appeals’ “nine nonexclusive factors in a
totality-of-factors test”108 governed the disposition of the issue. To that end, the
Court noted that no evidence suggested that Judge Wilson had conducted any official
judicial business on the social media page,109 or that the page itself had operated on
behalf of the First Judicial District Court.110 Furthermore, no government funding—
judicial or otherwise—had been used to create or maintain the social media page.111
As a result, the records associated with Judge Wilson’s social media page were “not
public records of a public body subject to IPRA disclosure requirements.”112
In addition, outside of its application of the Toomey factors to Judge
Wilson’s social media page, Pacheco also directly addressed the question of the
proper defendant in an IPRA enforcement action. Although Judge Wilson had
initially been named as a party to the lawsuit, in its original remand order to the Fifth
Judicial District Court the Supreme Court had directed the dismissal of Judge Wilson
as a party and the substitution of the records custodian for the First Judicial District
Court.113 The published decision in Pacheco later explained this order by stating that
“[t]he designated records custodian is the only official who is assigned IPRA
compliance duties” and “the only official who statutorily ‘is subject to an action to
enforce’ IPRA.”114

103. Id. ¶ 36, 415 P.3d at 512–13.
104. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. That Pacheco cited to IPRA’s definition of a public
body is marginally noteworthy if only because Toomey did not do so. See supra note 67.
105. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
106. “IPRA textually makes clear that it is aimed at ‘the affairs of government’ and the ‘official’ acts
of public officers and employees.” Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 27, 415 P.3d at 511.
107. Id. ¶ 29, 415 P.3d at 511.
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 32, 415 P.3d at 512.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 32, 415 P.3d at 512.
112. Id. ¶ 36, 415 P.3d at 512–13. The Supreme Court also rejected the requestor’s assertion that
certain “unsolicited extrajudicial comments” made on Judge Wilson’s social media page by members of
the public (comments that related to the original lawsuit and praised Judge Wilson’s rulings) transformed
records associated with the social media page into public records. See id. ¶ 33, 415 P.3d at 512 (noting
that such a conclusion “would blur any standards imposed by IPRA”).
113. See id. ¶ 19, 415 P.3d at 509 (“We also directed Judge Hudson to dismiss Judge Wilson as a
named defendant in the IPRA action and to substitute Stephen Pacheco, the lawfully designated IPRA
custodian of public records for the First Judicial District Court.”).
114. Id. ¶ 57, 415 P.3d at 516 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court apparently viewed this as a simple
issue, noting that it was “clearly answered in the text of IPRA itself.” Id.
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The next and most recent appellate case to substantively115 address the issue
of IPRA’s applicability to the records of private actors was the Court of Appeals’
decision in New Mexico Foundation for Open Government v. Corizon Health.116 That
case arose out of several contracts between the New Mexico Corrections Department
and Corizon Health, a private company, to provide healthcare services in certain New
Mexico prisons and detention centers from approximately June 2012 to May 2016.117
Although the private company ceased providing healthcare services after the
expiration of its contracts with the Corrections Department,118 it faced a number of
lawsuits from inmates who claimed that the company had violated their civil
rights.119 The private company entered into settlement agreements to resolve “at least
fifty-nine such civil claims.”120 These settlement agreements were then requested by
the petitioners (the Foundation for Open Government, the Albuquerque Journal, and
the Santa Fe New Mexican).121
The three petitioners individually sent IPRA requests asking to inspect and
copy all of the settlement agreements involving the private company.122 The
petitioners directed these requests initially to the Corrections Department, which
then responded by referring the requests directly to Corizon Health and stating that
the contract with the company specified that the company would defend and
indemnify the Corrections Department in the event of a lawsuit.123 The Corrections
Department took no further action on the records requests. Pursuant to this referral
from the Corrections Department, however, the petitioners individually sent their
115. This issue was mentioned only briefly in Dunn v. Brandt, where the petitioner argued, relying on
Toomey, that the records of a guardian ad litem were public records subject to IPRA because “a guardian
ad litem acts as ‘as an arm of the court.’” 2019-NMCA-061, ¶ 7, 450 P.3d 398, 401. However, the Court
of Appeals did not reach that issue in its opinion, instead assuming without deciding that the petitioner’s
assertion was correct but still ruling in favor of the respondents on the grounds that the records at issue
were shielded from disclosure by a protective order and the judicial deliberations privilege. See id. ¶ 17,
450 P.3d at 405.
116. 2020-NMCA-014, 460 P.3d 43.
117. Id. ¶ 2, 460 P.3d at 46.
118. See id. ( “Respondent stopped providing medical care services for NMCD after the Contract
ended.”).
119. See id. (noting that “certain inmates filed civil claims against Respondent alleging instances of
improper care and/or sexual assault”).
120. Id. ¶ 2, 460 P.3d at 46.
121. The Court of Appeals noted that the Petitioners sent their requests to the Corrections Department
as Corizon Health’s contract was terminating in May 2016. See id. (noting that the requests were sent to
the Corrections Department in “May and June 2016”).
122. See id. ¶ 3, 460 P.3d at 46 (“Petitioners separately submitted written IPRA requests to NMCD
requesting to inspect and copy all settlement documents involving Respondent in its role as medical
services contractor for NMCD.”).
123. See id. (“NMCD explained that under the Contract, Respondent defends and indemnifies
NMCD . . . .”). Given that the Department provided this written explanation to the Petitioners, and went
further by providing the Petitioners with Corizon Health’s contract information and forwarding the
Petitioners’ request directly to the company, the Department appears to have been acting as if Corizon
Health was a public body for the purposes of IPRA’s Section 14-2-8(E). See id. That section generally
requires a records request sent to the wrong public body to be forwarded to the correct one, along with an
explanation and the contact information for the correct records custodian. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-28(E) (2009) (setting forth procedures governing “the event that a written request is not made to the
custodian having possession of or responsibility for the public records requested”).
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requests directly to the private company, which initially indicated that it would
provide the requested settlement agreements but then later denied the petitioners’
requests outright.124
The petitioners in Corizon filed a petition for a writ of mandamus125 in
District Court to compel the private company to disclose the settlement agreements.
Importantly, the petition named the private company––and not the Corrections
Department––as the respondent.126 For its part, the private company did not appear
to challenge its status as the proper respondent in the case and even conceded at the
District Court merits hearing that it “stood ‘in the shoes of the State by providing
medical services to inmates.’”127 As a result, whether the private company was the
proper respondent in the case was not a question before either the District Court or
the Court of Appeals. Instead, the central and dispositive issue was whether the
settlement agreements were public records for the purposes of IPRA. The respondent
argued in the negative, maintaining that the mere fact that it had provided medical
services on behalf of the state did not transform its private records into public ones,
and the petitioners contended precisely the opposite.128 Applying the Toomey test,
the District Court held in favor of the petitioners, and granted the requested writ of
mandamus compelling the respondent to produce the settlement agreements.129
On appeal, the Court of Appeals described the issue before it as “whether
the Legislature intended for settlement agreements, entered into by third-party
entities and arising from the third-party’s performance of the public function, to be
public documents available under IPRA.”130 Citing to Toomey and IPRA’s definition
of a “public record” in Section 14-2-6(G),131 the Court concluded that the settlement
agreements were “public records subject to production under IPRA.”132 Central to
this conclusion was the Court’s observation that “the settlement agreements were
plainly created and maintained in relation to a public business, here, the medical care
124. The Court of Appeals decision noted that the company had initially agreed to release the
settlement agreements to the Petitioners in exchange for a two-week extension of time within which it
could redact the names of the inmates (the plaintiffs) involved in the lawsuits. See Corizon, 2020-NMCA014, ¶ 4, 460 P.3d at 46. Shortly thereafter, however, the company denied all three requests, arguing that
IPRA did not require it to disclose the records and the confidentiality provisions in the agreements
themselves prohibited the records’ disclosure. Id.
125. See id. ¶ 5, 460 P.3d at 46. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-12(B) (1993) (providing that a
District Court may issue “a writ of mandamus . . . to enforce the provisions of the Inspection of Public
Records Act”). This enforcement mechanism became a small issue at the Court of Appeals, where the
respondent for the first time argued that mandamus was an improper remedy because the case posed “a
fact intensive inquiry ill-suited for resolution by writ of mandamus.” Corizon, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 24,
460 P.3d at 52. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument by emphasizing both that IPRA itself
permitted the petitioners to seek mandamus relief, id. ¶ 25, 460 P.3d at 52, and that, “Petitioners have a
clear legal right of enforcement against Respondent, and Respondent has a clear legal duty to provide
public records to Petitioners under Section 14-2-12.” Id. ¶ 26, 460 P.3d at 52.
126. See generally Corizon, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 5, 460 P.3d at 46.
127. Id. ¶ 7, 460 P.3d at 47.
128. See id. ¶ 8, 460 P.3d at 47–48.
129. See id. ¶ 8, 460 P.3d at 47 (“[T]he district court granted the petition, and . . . issued its final order
granting writ of mandamus.”).
130. Id. ¶ 17, 460 P.3d at 49.
131. See id.
132. Id. ¶ 18.
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and personal safety of the inmates held by the [Corrections Department].”133 As the
Respondent had entered into a contract with the Corrections Department to perform
a clear government function,134 the Court of Appeals had little difficulty in
concluding that the settlement agreements arising out of that contractual duty were
public records. The Court also stated, in describing its own holding, that it had
“concluded . . . there is no distinction between Respondent and a public entity
concerning the issues here.”135
II.

INTERPRETING TOOMEY, PACHECO, AND CORIZON

The decisions in Toomey, Pacheco, and Corizon must be interpreted and
considered in the light of the precise issue before the court: whether the private
entity’s records were held “on behalf of” a public body so as to become subject to
disclosure under IPRA.136 Viewed narrowly, these three holdings are hardly
disputable given IPRA’s definition of a public record, which includes those records
held “on behalf of” a public body,137 as well as IPRA’s overall purpose of providing
the public access to “the greatest possible information” about governmental
affairs.138 The records requested in Toomey were “recordings of three City
Commission meetings and one city workshop” held by a private entity who had
contracted with the City to operate a public access television channel.139 Similarly,
in Corizon, the requested records were settlement agreements entered into by a
private company that arose directly from its performance of a contract it held with
the Corrections Department.140 In both of these cases, the relevant records existed
solely because the private entity had contracted with a public body to perform a
governmental service on the public body’s behalf. By contrast, in Pacheco, no
evidence suggested that Judge Wilson’s social media page had any relationship to
public business or governmental service: it was an election campaign account on
which no official judicial activity was ever conducted.141 The records associated with
that account were clearly not held on behalf of a public body. In that sense, then,
looking to the narrow holdings in each of these cases, the three decisions are hardly
even debatable. The cases were not wrongly decided.
However, beyond their narrow holdings, these three decisions have left real
uncertainty in their wake as to whether the private entity is itself subject to IPRA or

133. Id. ¶ 18, 460 P.3d at 50.
134. “Allowing private entities who contract with a public entity ‘to circumvent a citizen’s right of
access to records by contracting’ with a public entity to perform a public function ‘would thwart the very
purpose of IPRA and mark a significant departure from New Mexico’s presumption of openness at the
heart of our access law.’” Id. ¶ 19, 460 P.3d at 50 (quoting Toomey, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 26, 287 P.3d at
371).
135. Corizon, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 21, 460 P.3d at 51.
136. See supra notes 64, 102, and 129, and accompanying texts. Of course, each of these cases
involved a number of issues related to IPRA, but these other issues are not generally pertinent to this
analysis.
137. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 121.
141. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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merely its records. This distinction—whether IPRA applies to the private actor or
the private actor’s records—was thrown into sharp relief by the fact that the only
named defendant in Corizon was a private company.142 Notwithstanding the fact that
the private company was providing governmental services on behalf of the
Corrections Department,143 the actual public body was completely uninvolved in the
litigation. To be sure, the private company in Corizon did not argue that they were
an improper defendant (and in fact conceded that they were the proper defendant),144
but this still leads to the question of whether, moving forward, Toomey and Corizon
stand for the proposition that a private contractor may be considered a public body
for the purposes of IPRA.
Moreover, the series of events leading up to litigation in Corizon further
illustrates the confusion in New Mexico as to whether IPRA applies to private
entities themselves or merely their records. In Corizon, the requestors originally
submitted their requests to the Corrections Department,145 who then promptly
referred the requests to the private company rather than working itself to obtain the
records or deny the request.146 That the Corrections Department, a public body,
referred the request to its contractor rather than handle the request itself demonstrates
that at least some public bodies in New Mexico are operating under the assumption
that they need take no responsibility for the records held by their contractors, and
that they may simply refer the requests to their contractors to be fulfilled or denied.147
Similarly, the fact that the requestors in Corizon directed their requests to the
Corrections Department and then had to redirect their requests to the company148 also
demonstrates that they themselves were unsure of who the “public body” was for the
purposes of their request.
This confusion and ambiguity originated in the Toomey decision.
Notwithstanding the clarity of the Court’s limited holding in that case, the language
and the reasoning of the opinion itself left real uncertainty as to whether it stood for
the proposition that IPRA may apply to records held by a private entity or the private
entity itself. In describing the central issue before it, for example, the Court of
Appeals in Toomey first referred to the issue as whether the relevant records “were
made on behalf of the City so as to constitute public records within the meaning of

142. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The private company provided healthcare services in
certain New Mexico prisons and detention centers for approximately four years. N.M. Found. Open Gov.
v. Corizon Health, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 2, 460 P.3d at 46.
144. See Corizon, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 7, 460 P.3d 43, 47 (noting that the respondent “agreed that it
stood ‘in the shoes of the State by providing medical services to inmates’”).
145. See supra note 121.
146. See supra note 122.
147. Although the contract between the private company and the Corrections Department did contain
an indemnification clause, see supra note 122, this does not explain why neither the Corrections
Department nor its records custodian was a defendant in Corizon, nor does it explain why the private
company was a defendant in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Pacheco that the public body’s
custodian is the proper defendant in an IPRA lawsuit. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
148. See Corizon, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 3, 460 P.3d at 46 (explaining that after the Corrections
Department referred the requestors to the private company, “Each Petitioner then sent written IPRA
requests to Respondent requesting the same information previously requested of NMCD.”).

392

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 2

IPRA,”149 but then later rephrased it as “whether a private actor that contracts with a
governmental entity to perform a public function is subject to the provisions of
IPRA.”150 In describing its ultimate legal conclusion, the Court first stated that it had
found “that under the totality of the circumstances, the SCC was the functional
equivalent of a public agency in this case,”151 but then later stated that it had held
“that the recordings of the City meetings were public records subject to inspection
under IPRA.”152 These are different formulations.
The cases cited in Toomey also add to this uncertainty. The overwhelming
majority of the out-of-state cases cited in Toomey, for example, involved courts from
other states grappling with the issue of whether a private entity could be considered
a public agency for the purposes of their respective state’s public records law.153
Indeed, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on and adoption of the Schwab test is striking
because, in that case, Florida’s Supreme Court specifically noted that the word
“agency” (Florida’s functional equivalent to New Mexico’s “public body”) was
defined broadly in its state’s public records law “to include private entities ‘acting
on behalf of any public agency.’”154 Thus, the issue in Schwab—the principal case
on which Toomey relied—was whether a private entity itself was essentially a public
body under Florida’s public records law.155 Along the same lines, the Court of
Appeals’ reference to Hobbes156 is also telling, because there the New Mexico
Supreme Court had held that the board of directors of a private company was in effect
“a governing body of a municipality, or a governmental board or commission of a
subdivision of the state” so as to be subject to a predecessor of New Mexico’s Open
Meetings Act.157
Corizon also contains ambiguous language. At one point, when describing
its own holding, the Court of Appeals stated that it had “concluded above there is no
distinction between Respondent and a public entity concerning the issues here.”158
Similarly, it also summarized a portion of the Petitioners’ argument at the District
Court level as “even if Respondent had settlement autonomy in the context of civil
lawsuits, such alone did not recharacterize Respondent’s central function from that

149. State ex rel. Toomey v. Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 287 P.3d 364, 366.
150. Id. ¶ 10, 287 P.3d at 367.
151. Id. ¶ 23, 287 P.3d at 370.
152. Id. ¶ 29, 287 P.3d at 371.
153. See supra note 70.
154. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Grp., Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029,
1031 (Fla. 1992) (“This broad definition serves to ensure that a public agency cannot avoid disclosure
under the Act by contractually delegating to a private entity that which otherwise would be an agency
responsibility.”)
155. See id. at 1031 (noting that the issue was “whether a private entity is subject to the Public Records
Act”). In this respect, Florida’s public records law is fundamentally different than New Mexico’s.
Whereas Florida defines the term “agency” as inclusive of “any . . . private agency, person, partnership,
corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency,” FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (2018),
New Mexico’s definition of a public body does not include private entities.
156. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
157. Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 1966-NMSC-150, ¶ 4, 417 P.2d 32, 33. See also Open Meetings
Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 10-15-1 to -4 (2013).
158. N.M. Found. Open Gov. v. Corizon Health, 2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 21, 460 P.3d 43, 51.
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of a public entity subject to IPRA.”159 Although these references are far less extensive
than those in Toomey, they remain conspicuous given that the only defendant in the
case was a private company.
One critical fact suggests that neither Toomey nor Corizon were intended to
hold that private entities become public bodies for the purposes of IPRA by
functioning on behalf of governmental entities: neither decision actually cited or
even mentioned IPRA’s definition of “public body” in Section 14-2-6(F).160 Instead,
the holdings of both cases explicitly rested on the “on behalf of” language in IPRA’s
definition of a public record.161 Having not reviewed the definition of a public body
to determine whether it was broad enough to include private entities, a reasonable
interpretation of both cases would be that they were not intended to suggest that the
private contractors were public bodies.
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Pacheco did cite to
IPRA’s definition of a “public body,”162 its overall language and rationale was far
less ambiguous (or perhaps merely more fastidious) than that in Toomey and Corizon.
The Supreme Court used relatively consistent language when describing its holding,
providing that “in the circumstances presented in this record, the contents of Judge
Wilson’s personal election campaign Facebook page were not public records of a
public body subject to IPRA disclosure requirements.”163 Similarly, in describing the
function of the Toomey test, the Supreme Court said that it was used to determine
whether a public body had “involve[d] a private entity in conducting governmental
business and subject[ed] the otherwise private entity’s records relating to that
governmental activity to IPRA requirements.”164 As a result, Pacheco does not
appear to stand for the proposition that private entities may be considered public
bodies for the purposes of IPRA.165

159. Id. ¶ 6, 460 P.3d at 47 (emphasis added).
160. At the time of the Toomey decision, IPRA’s definition of “public body” was in Section 14-2-6(E)
and its definition of “public record” was in Section 14-2-6(F). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-6 (2011). The
statute was amended in 2013 to add a new definition of “protected personal identifier information,” which
is when the two definitions of “public body” and “public record” were recodified to their current locations
in the statutory code. See N.M. LAWS 2013, ch. 117, § 1. In any case, Toomey cited to IPRA’s definition
of a “public record” but not its definition of the term “public body.” State ex rel. Toomey v. Truth or
Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 10, 287 P.3d 364, 367.
161. See Toomey, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 10, 287 P.3d at 367 (citing to IPRA’s definition of a public
record and observing that “[t]he ‘on behalf of’ language, however, is not defined”); see also Corizon,
2020-NMCA-014, ¶ 18, 460 P.3d at 50 (emphasizing that “we rely on the language of Section 14-2-6(G),”
which contains IPRA’s definition of a public record).
162. Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 27, 415 P.3d 505, 511. The Court’s analysis, however,
did not appear to suggest a connection between this definition and the Toomey test.
163. Id. ¶ 36, 415 P.3d at 512–13.
164. Id. ¶ 29, 415 P.3d at 511.
165. There is at least one line in Pacheco that may be interpreted differently. In refuting the requestor’s
argument that comments made by third parties on a social media page could render it a public record, the
Supreme Court stated, “It would blur any standards imposed by IPRA if we were to hold that third-party
comments about an officeholder’s performance of the officeholder’s official duties that are communicated
through social media, news outlets, online discussion sites, or other nongovernmental entities would
transform those entities into public bodies and subject their records to IPRA disclosure and inspection
obligations.” Pacheco, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 33, 415 P.3d at 512 (emphasis added).
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However, even if Pacheco does not indicate that Toomey stands for the
proposition that private entities may be considered public bodies for the purposes of
IPRA, this by no means appears to be an issue of settled law. As mentioned
previously, the facts and circumstances surrounding Corizon (the most recent case
to analyze Toomey in depth) suggests that some public bodies and records requestors
in New Mexico view private contractors as the equivalent of public bodies, at least
where the contractor is acting on behalf of a public body. It also suggests that some
public bodies and records requestors are operating under the belief that records
requests can be submitted directly to a private contractor and that private entities may
be proper defendants in legal actions to enforce IPRA. Although no private entity
has yet challenged these premises in any appellate case as of yet, it would seem to
be an argument that stands a high likelihood of being raised in the near future.
III.

PRIVATE ENTITIES ARE NOT PUBLIC BODIES

Notwithstanding the current ambiguity on this issue, Toomey should not be
interpreted as holding that records requests may be directed specifically to private
entities or that private entities are proper defendants in IPRA enforcement actions.
This is so because private entities—be they companies, nonprofits, or individuals—
are not public bodies under IPRA. The statute’s plain language unambiguously
establishes that a public body is responsible for those records held on its behalf by a
private entity. Equally important, an interpretation of Toomey to the effect that
private entities may in some contexts be considered public bodies for the purposes
of IPRA would frustrate the purpose of the statute, serving only to delay access to
public records and create confusion on the part of records requestors. Toomey and its
progeny should be interpreted based on the actual holdings of the cases, as clarifying
IPRA’s definition of a public record and confirming that those records held on behalf
of a public body by a private entity are, in fact, public records subject to inspection.
The single most important reason why Toomey should not be interpreted as
holding that a private contractor may be considered a public body for the purposes
of IPRA is that the statute itself contains a definition of a public body that clearly
excludes private entities.166 As defined by Section 14-2-6(G), public bodies consist
of:
[T]he executive, legislative and judicial branches of state and local
governments and all advisory boards, commissions, committees,
agencies or entities created by the constitution or any branch of
government that receives any public funding, including political
subdivisions, special taxing districts, school districts and
institutions of higher education.167
This definition clearly shows, by its plain language, that an entity must be
an actual subdivision of state or local government in order to qualify as a public

166. That Toomey, and for that matter also Corizon, did not cite or mention IPRA’s definition of a
public body, also strongly suggests that the Court of Appeals did not intend to suggest that private
contractors were public bodies for the purposes of public records requests. See supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-6(G) (2018).
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body. Even its reference to entities in receipt of public funding includes only, in
context, a “branch of government that receives any public funding.”168 Thus, the
definition of a public body itself leaves no ambiguity as to whether it depends on the
particular records involved or whether it includes private entities: it plainly does
not.169
The role of the public body’s records custodian is equally dispositive on
these issues. A records request clearly cannot be submitted to a private entity because
it must be submitted to and handled specifically by the public body’s records
custodian.170 This in particular is not ambiguous and this requirement is not
generalized, as IPRA states that the records custodian specifically “shall . . . respond
to requests” and “provide proper and reasonable opportunities to inspect public
records.”171 Where a request is denied by the public body, IPRA is not vague or
nondescript as it pertains to who must provide an explanation of the denial: it places
this burden again on the shoulders of the public body’s records custodian.172
Similarly, a private entity cannot be a defendant in an action to enforce IPRA because
the statute specifically provides, and the Supreme Court confirmed in Pacheco,173
that an action to enforce the statute must be brought against the records custodian,174
not another employee.
The larger statutory context of IPRA shows yet another inherent
inconsistency in concluding that private entities may be public bodies able to receive
requests and be subject to enforcement actions. Were Toomey to be interpreted as
holding that private contractors may be public bodies, this would necessarily only be
the case in limited contexts, depending on the particular records involved and the
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. This conclusion may be qualified slightly by the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in
Hobbes, upon which Toomey partially relied. See Toomey v. Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104,
¶ 20, 287 P.3d 364, 369 (citing Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbs, 1966-NMSC-150, 417 P.2d 32). In Hobbes,
the Supreme Court determined that a private entity could effectively be “a governing body of a
municipality, or a governmental board or commission of a subdivision of the state, supported by public
funds” so as to be subject to New Mexico’s laws governing open meetings where it received significant
government funding and operated exclusively for the benefit of a municipality. Hobbes, 1966-NMSC-150,
¶ 4, 417 P.2d at 33. Notwithstanding the Court’s citation to Hobbes in Toomey, the cases are quite
distinguishable because in Hobbes, the private entity operated exclusively for the benefit of a local
government body and therefore in general would constitute a political subdivision, whereas in Toomey
and Corizon, the private contractor could only constitute a public body for the purposes of specific records
and records requests. See id. As a result, it may be theoretically possible for a private entity who receives
significant government funding and operates exclusively for the benefit of a state or local governmental
subdivision to be a public body under IPRA, not for the purposes of particular records but in total, but this
would require very unique and limited circumstances.
170. See supra notes 30 and 32 and accompanying texts. To that end, when a requestor sends a request
to an employee or individual who is not the designated custodian, IPRA mandates that the request be
forwarded to the custodian specifically. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-8(E) (2009) (providing that, where
a request is not sent to the custodian directly by the requestor, “the person receiving the request shall
promptly forward the request to the custodian of the requested records”).
171. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-7 (2011).
172. See id.
173. See Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 57, 415 P.3d 505, (holding that the records custodian
is “the only official who statutorily ‘is subject to an action to enforce’ IPRA”).
174. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-11(C) (1993) (“A custodian . . . is subject to an action to enforce
the provisions of the Inspection of Public Records Act.”).
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functions performed by the private entity.175 Under the plain language of IPRA,
however, whether an entity is a public body for the purposes of the statute does not
depend on the particular records involved. The statute’s definition of a “public body”
makes no reference to records. Moreover, the statute imposes general obligations on
public bodies entirely outside of specific records and specific records requests. All
public bodies must, irrespective of any particular request it receives, designate at
least one employee as a “records custodian” responsible for receiving and responding
to records requests.176 All public bodies—again, outside of any particular request—
must post a notice describing the public’s right to inspect public records and the
procedures through which a request may be made.177 These provisions leave no
ambiguity that, under IPRA, whether an entity is a public body does not depend on
the particular records involved.
Although Toomey and Corizon addressed records held by private
contractors, this issue should also be examined in light of the records held by public
employees on their own private devices or at their own homes. Like records
maintained by a private contractor, records maintained by a public employee on his
or her own cell phone or private email address would still be subject to IPRA so long
as they related to public business.178 And yet, despite these two circumstances being
legally indistinguishable from one another, no court, public body, or records
requestor could possibly maintain that the public employee would constitute a public
body unto himself or herself, or for that matter that a records request could be
directed to the employee rather than the custodian or that the employee could be
named as a defendant to a lawsuit. The public body would clearly be responsible for
responding to a request for such records under IPRA.
Lastly, holding that a private entity may constitute a public body able to
receive IPRA requests and be sued in an enforcement action would carry real
practical consequences. For one, if a private entity may be a public body able to
receive IPRA requests, then huge numbers of private companies in New Mexico will
need to immediately designate their own records custodian.179 Far more importantly,
such an interpretation of IPRA would frustrate the purpose of the statute by delaying

175. Such an interpretation would only transform a private entity into a public body when the private
entity is acting on behalf of a public body. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. A private contractor
would not, at least as a general rule, function as a public body for the purposes of all of its records unless
it operated exclusively on behalf of a public body.
176. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-7 (2011); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
177. § 14-2-7(E).
178. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-6(G) (2018). To the extent that an employee holds records—for
example, in an employee’s private email account—that “relate to public business,” they almost certainly
would be subject to inspection. See id.
179. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-7 (2011) (“Each public body shall designate at least one custodian
of public records . . . .”). A public body’s designation of a records custodian is not discretionary: it is an
obligatory duty under IPRA. For this reason, if private contractors are themselves subject to IPRA and
required to themselves receive and respond to requests, they must also designate their own records
custodians.
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access to public records.180 As occurred prior to the Corizon litigation,181 if a private
entity may be itself subject to IPRA outside of the applicable public body, this will
likely only confuse records requestors, who would logically direct their requests first
to the public body and then be forced later to redirect their attention to the private
contractor. Given that many private contractors are unknown to the general public,
most records requestors would not know to whom they should submit a request other
than the public body. Inevitably, this would delay access to public records because
the deadlines for inspection would start when the private company’s records
custodian receives the request, as opposed to when the earlier request was received
by the public body’s custodian.182 Given that IPRA must be interpreted in light of its
purpose,183 these practical consequences show yet another flaw in interpreting
Toomey as holding that private entities may be public bodies themselves subject to
the statute.
Instead, the proper interpretation of IPRA and Toomey is that public bodies
themselves are responsible for providing records held on their behalf by private
entities. The Toomey test determines whether the records of the private entity are
being held on behalf of the public body, but the public body itself is still responsible
for providing the record or otherwise handling the request. Pursuant to IPRA, the
records request must be directed to the public body’s records custodian,184 and the
public body cannot avoid responsibility by redirecting the requestor to a private
entity.185 The proper defendant in an IPRA lawsuit is, as stated in Pacheco,186 the
records custodian for the public body. This interpretation is consistent with the
express language of IPRA, as well as its legislative intent of providing the public
with access to the greatest possible information as to governmental affairs.

180. The purpose of IPRA is explicitly to “to ensure . . . that all persons are entitled to the greatest
possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of public officers and
employees.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-5 (1993). See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying texts.
182. The deadlines under IPRA begin to run upon the records custodian’s receipt of the request. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text. Were the private entity treated as a public body unto itself, IPRA’s
deadlines would only start upon the private entity’s receipt of the request. The actual public body—that
is, the public body on whose behalf the private entity is operating—would not be the custodian of the
records and therefore its receipt of the request would not trigger IPRA’s deadline.
183. See, e.g., San Juan Agr. Water Users Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 2011-NMSC-011, ¶ 14, 257 P.3d 884,
888 (noting that courts “construe IPRA in light of its purpose”); Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010NMCA-096, ¶ 16, 242 P.3d 501, 506 (explaining that, in interpreting IPRA and its exceptions, courts must
“begin . . . with the strong presumption that the public has a right to inspect”).
184. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-8(A) (2009) (“Any person wishing to inspect public records may
submit an oral or written request to the custodian.”).
185. To the extent that public bodies might raise concerns as to their ability to obtain public records
from a private entity, it is incumbent on the public body to establish adequate safeguards (such as
contractual provisions with private contractors or employees) to ensure that its records custodian has
access to all those records related to public business.
186. See 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 19, 415 P.3d 505, 509.
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CONCLUSION
Because of the increasing proliferation of government contracts,187 as well
as the modern reality that public officers and employees maintain private electronic
accounts and home offices that intersect with their professional obligations, the
issues surrounding IPRA and private entities are certain to arise again in the coming
years. The boundaries of Toomey and Corizon, particularly as they relate to private
companies contracting with state and local governmental entities to perform public
services, are likely to be tested as records requestors seek access to more information.
And, although the private contractors involved in Toomey and Corizon did not raise
the issue, a similarly-situated private entity sued by a requestor under IPRA may
very well raise the defense that it is not a proper defendant in an IPRA action. As a
result, New Mexico courts will almost certainly be called upon to clarify the holding
of Toomey as to the issues identified in this article.
Interpreted in accordance with both its plain language and its statutory
intent, IPRA applies only to the records held by private entities and not the private
entities themselves. When a requestor submits a request to inspect records held by a
private entity on behalf of a public body, the request must be submitted to the public
body’s records custodian, and then the public body itself must work to provide those
records to the requestor. It is emphatically not sufficient for a public body to simply
refer a requestor to its private contractor, because IPRA clarifies that the public
body’s records custodian must respond to the request either by providing the
requested records188 or a proper explanation of why the public body will not permit
inspection.189 And, where a requestor must resort to legal means of enforcing the
provisions of the statute, the action must be maintained against the public body and
its records custodian,190 not a private contractor.
To be clear, Toomey, Pacheco, and Corizon were not wrongly-decided
cases. As the Court of Appeals stated most eloquently in Toomey, if a court were to
hold that records related to the provision of governmental services by private
contractors were not public records, it would “thwart the very purpose of IPRA and
mark a significant departure from New Mexico’s presumption of openness at the
heart of our access law.”191 The Court of Appeals was correct in Toomey and Corizon
that records, at least in the context of those cases, must be public records because
they relate to public business and are effectively maintained on behalf of a public
body. In that sense, interpreted narrowly and looking to the precise holdings of the
cases, Toomey, Pacheco, and Corizon properly interpreted IPRA by facilitating
access to public records.
But it is pivotal that these cases not be misinterpreted so as to transform
private entities into public bodies in the context of some records and some records
requests. Although these decisions did include language which might suggest that
private entities are themselves subject to IPRA and are themselves the proper
defendants in an IPRA action, such an interpretation is at odds with both the statute’s
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Ni & Bretschneider, supra note 48.
See supra note 27.
See supra note 34.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
Toomey v. Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 26, 287 P.3d 364, 371.
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definition of a public body and the statute’s overall structure. For the purposes of
IPRA, a public body is always a public body, not varying from request to request.
And a public body cannot avoid its responsibilities under IPRA by simply referring
a requestor to its private contractor. IPRA is clear that “to provide persons with such
information is an essential function of a representative government and an integral
part of the routine duties of public officers and employees.”192 This requires any
public body to be responsible for the records related to its public business, even those
created and maintained by its private contractors.

192. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-5 (1993).

